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The Three-Step Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in

National Copyright Law
Abstract

The first version of the three-step test emerged at the 1967 Stockholm

Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention. With the inclusion of
versions of the test in the TRIPS Agreement of April 1994, the two WIPO
“Internet” treaties of December 1996, the more recent Beijing Treaty on

Audiovisual Performances of June 24, 2012, and the Marrakesh Treaty to

Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually

Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (VIP Treaty) of June 27, 2013, the test has
taken on the central function of allowing and enabling tailor-made solutions at
the national level.

The three rather abstract criteria of the test offer room for different

interpretations. Various alternative approaches have been developed in the legal
literature and applied by national courts, including an understanding of the test’s
factors as elements of a global balancing exercise; and a reverse reading of the
test starting with the last, most flexible criterion.

There are also parallels

between factors in Anglo-American fair use and fair dealing legislation and the
three step test.

The study herein concludes that the three-step test in international copyright
law does not preclude flexible national legislation allowing the courts to identify
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individual use privileges case-by-case and that the three-step test can serve as a

source of inspiration for national law makers seeking to institute flexible
exceptions and limitations at the domestic level.
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In the current debate on flexibility in the area of copyright limitations and
exceptions (E&Ls), the three-step test is sometimes presented as an obstacle to

the adoption of open-ended, flexible provisions at the national level. A flexible

domestic provision on E&Ls, so runs the argument, is incompatible with the

requirement of “certain special cases” contained in some versions of the three-

step test. A closer analysis of the drafting history and policy considerations
underlying the test, however, shows that flexible lawmaking in the field of E&Ls

does not necessarily justify this concern about a conflict with international law.

We proceed as follows to explain the test and how it can be used to enable openended E&Ls. In Part I, we consider the drafting history of the international three-

step test and demonstrate that it was intended to serve as a flexible balancing

tool offering national policy makers sufficient breathing space to satisfy
economic, social and cultural needs. In Part II, we unpack the abstract criteria of

the three-step test to show that they can be interpreted flexibly. In Part III, we

argue that, because the international three-step test was designed to
accommodate multiple legal systems, including the common law copyright

tradition, it would be inconsistent to assume that flexible open ended national
provisions on E&Ls, such as fair dealing or fair use, are per se impermissible
under the test. In Part IV, we suggest that national legislation can preserve the

flexibility of the international three-step test by allowing the courts to identify
new use privileges on the basis of the test’s abstract criteria. Finally, in Part V we

bring together the strands of the analysis to suggest that open-ended E&Ls at the

national level do not run counter to the international three-step test and that, on
An early draft of this report was presented in 2012 at a meeting organized by American
University Washington College of Law’s Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property
(PIJIP). The Authors wish to thank participants for their helpful comments, especially Professors
Peter Jaszi, Michael Caroll and Sean Flynn.
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the contrary, the international three-step test can serve as a resource for
national lawmakers seeking to establish a flexible system of E&Ls domestically.
Part I – The Emergence of the Three-Step Test

A. The three-step test in the Berne Convention
The first three-step test in international copyright law emerged as article 9(2) of

the Berne Convention. It served as a counterweight to the formal recognition of a

general right of reproduction at the 1967 Stockholm Revision Conference. The

right of reproduction was not added to the Berne Convention only at the
Stockholm Conference; it was already there in various forms. 5 It is true, however,

that an “omnibus” right of reproduction was recognized at the Stockholm
5 In

the earliest official document, the circular sent by the Swiss government on December 3,

1883, to the “governments of all civilized countries” it wrote: “It would certainly be a great
advantage if a general understanding could be achieved at the outset whereby that exalted

principle, that principle so to speak of natural law, were proclaimed that the author of a literary
or artistic work, whatever his nationality and the place of reproduction, must be protected
everywhere on the same footing as the citizens of every nation.” Berne Convention Centenary

1886-1986 (Geneva: WIPO,1986), at 84. The Berlin Act (1908) contained several “reproduction

rights” or, more precisely perhaps, versions of a more general right of reproduction subsumed
under those special mentions. Article 9: “Serial stories, tales, and all other works, whether

literary, scientific, or artistic, whatever their object, published in the newspapers or periodicals of
one of the countries of the Union may not be reproduced in the other countries without the
consent of the authors.” Article 12: “The following shall be especially included among the
unlawful reproductions to which the present Convention applies…”; and Article 14: “authors of

literary, scientific or artistic works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction
and public representation of their works by cinematography.” (Id., at 229) Some of those

versions of the right were inherently limited. For example, article 12 – quoted from above –

which dealt with what we would call the right of adaptation, only applied if the adaptation was
“only the reproduction of [the original] work, in the same form or in another form without

essential alterations, additions, or abridgments, and do not present the character of a new
original work.” (id., at 229).
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Conference, and with it, the need for a general clause regulating E&Ls to the
reproduction right. Many options were considered before countries agreed on
the three-step test as a compromise solution. Civil law countries were more
comfortable with a list of specific, named exceptions, as they are found today in
the laws of countries like France, Germany or the Netherlands to name just three.

Other countries (India and Romania in particular) had proposed compulsory

licenses for reproduction. Those proposals were not accepted but another
diplomatic conference was organized four years later in Paris (1971) which

adopted the Appendix to the Convention. That Appendix specifically provides for

certain compulsory licenses that can be issued by developing countries mostly
for the reproduction and translation of books. There was some discussion of a

proposed text for a more open-ended test. The initial version of the test read “in

certain particular cases where the reproduction is not contrary to the legitimate

interests of the author.” It was replaced by: “in certain special cases where the

reproduction does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
authors.” An interesting linguistic twist must then be noted. Still today, the
official text of the Berne Convention, in case of discrepancy between linguistic
versions, is the French version. 6 However, the three-step test, in particular the

third step, is based on language submitted (in English) by the UK, translated into

(official) French and now retranslated into English versions of the Convention.

The Stockholm report notes the difficulty of translating the phrase “does not
unreasonably prejudice” in French. They opted for “ne cause pas un préjudice
injustifié,” which changes the meaning slightly because it seems to affirm that

some degree of prejudice is justified. Put differently, the English (original)

version imposes a test of reasonableness while the French (official) text (which,

however, must guide the interpreter in case of discrepancy) imposes a test of
justification. This potentially matters a great deal: reasonableness could be

interpreted quantitatively and imply that compensation can reduce the prejudice
to a reasonable level, while justification seems to require a valid normative
6 Berne Convention (1971), art. 37(1)(c).
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grounding, something closer to a qualitative test based on the policies underlying
the adoption of an E&L.

The next question is whether the three steps are separate tests. The answer to
this question should be informed by but cannot be entirely deduced from its
drafting history. That history is often understood to be limited to the following

passages in the conference records, in which the steps were considered
sequentially:

The Committee also adopted a proposal by the Drafting Committee that
the second condition should be placed before the first, as this would
afford a more logical order for the interpretation of the rule. If it is
considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the
work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that
reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work,
the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case
would it be possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory
license, or to provide for use without payment. A practical example might
be photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very
large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a
normal exploitation of the work. If it implies a rather large number of
copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according
to national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small
number of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without
payment, particularly for individual or scientific use. 7

A more thorough analysis suggests, however, that a distinction can be drawn

between the analytical process suggested by this paragraph and the normative
context. While the steps can be considered sequentially--and presumably some

will apply more directly in one case than another--it should not be overlooked

that the test constitutes a single analytical whole and serves the ultimate goal to

strike an appropriate balance. For example, the prima facie unreasonableness of
prejudice to rights holders can be negated by compensation in appropriate cases.

Hence, a sequential application does not mean that the third step should not to
7 See

WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Geneva: WIPO 1971, Report on the Work of Main Committee I, p. 1145-1146.
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be considered if the second step is not met. 8 We come back to this in Part II
below.

Another feature of the test as it emerged in 1967 was that it was meant as a guide

to national legislators. This issue, namely the locus of the test, is essential to its

interpretation. The notion of “special case,” if considered as a directive to

national legislators, means that a rule concerning an E&L must be special, which
one could define as limited in scope, or as having a special purpose. 9 The test is

thus meant to judge the exception as a rule, not its application in a specific case
to a given author, work and user.

The rest of the test’s development in international intellectual property law is
rather well-known by now. It was adopted in four provisions of the TRIPS

Agreement (articles 9, 13, 26.2 and 30) and inspired the drafters of article 17. 10

It has also been incorporated in arts. 10(1) and (2) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty

(Dec. 20, 1996); art. 16(2) of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(Dec. 20, 1996); art. 13(2) of the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances

(June 24, 2012); and art. 11 of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to
Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise

Print Disabled (June 27, 2013). It has also been used in several EU directives 11, a
number of trade agreements and also incorporated in a number of national laws.

8

Even if the drafting history of Berne may support sequential steps, such a reading of the test
would be mandatory only in the context of the Berne three-step test and not in the context of any
of the subsequent versions in other Agreements which follow other rationales and have other
histories (see below Part II B).
9 The former view was adopted by two WTO dispute-settlement panels as we will see in part II,
infra. The latter view had been defended by Professor Sam Ricketson in his first book on the
Convention, though the second edition (coauthored with Professor Jane Ginsburg) takes a
different approach. S. Ricketson and J.C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford Univ. Press, 2006), vol. 1 at 764.
10 Dealing with the incorporation of the Berne Convention, and exceptions to copyright, to
designs and patent rights, respectively. Articled 17 limits certain exceptions to trademark rights.
11 See for example Article 5.5 of the Directive of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain
aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society; Article 9.3 of the Directive of
14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs and Article 6.3 of the Directive of 11
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases; Recital 20 of the Directive of 25 October 2012
on certain permitted uses of orphan works.
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Concerns follow from the fact that the language of the test changes, sometimes
significantly, each time it appears somewhere new. In TRIPS arts. 26.2 and 30,

for instance, “special” was replaced by “limited,” and in art. 13, “author” was

replaced by “right holder” (as if media companies exploiting works of authors

always had interests coextensive with those of authors). In two instantiations of
the test in TRIPS (26.2 and 30), the legitimate interests of third parties were

added to the third step, a significant change to be sure. As noted in WTO disputesettlement panel reports dealing with the three-step test, 12 this seems to change

the normative equation of the third step because users’ interests may not be of
the same nature as those of right holders. It also raises the question what role if
any third party interests should play in copyright (art. 13 of TRIPS and 9(2) of

Berne as incorporated into TRIPS) where those interests are not mentioned. 13

These essentially unexplained drafting changes (variations on the original, 1967
version are rarely well explained or documented) are something that policy
makers, dispute-settlement entities and legislators must bear in mind.

Another word on the transposition of the Berne test in TRIPS may be in order.
The Berne test qua Berne still applies because Berne, including its article 9(2),

was incorporated into TRIPS. In the Authors’ view, the system of E&Ls as it exists

in Berne was not modified by TRIPS. This means that an exception permitted by

another provision of Berne need not pass the test as an additional condition. For
12 For

an overview of related WTO Dispute Settlement cases, see D. Gervais, The TRIPS
Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell 2012, p. 274-279; C.M.
Correa, Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS
Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007; M.R.F. Senftleben, “Towards a Horizontal
Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? – WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the
Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law”, International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 407; M. Ficsor, “How Much of
What? The Three-Step Test and Its Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases”,
RIDA 192 (2002), p. 111; J. Oliver, “Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on the Three-Step
Test”, Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 25 (2002), p. 119; D.J. Brennan, “The Three-Step Test
Frenzy: Why the TRIPS Panel Decision might be considered Per Incuriam”, Intellectual Property
Quarterly 2002, p. 213; J.C. Ginsburg, “Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel
Decision and the ‘Three-Step Test’ for Copyright Exceptions”, RIDA 2001, p. 13; P.B. Hugenholtz,
“De wettelijke beperkingen beperkt. De WTO geeft de driestappentoets tanden”, Tijdschrift voor
auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 2000, p. 197; C. Geiger, “The Role of the Three-Step Test in the
Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society”, e-Copyright Bulletin January-March
2007.
13 Of course, E&Ls tend to be established for the benefit of users in the first place.
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example, some E&Ls in the field of cable distribution (e.g. compulsory licensing
under article 11bis(2)) and sound recordings (Berne article 13(1)) are self-

contained. This would be true of other E&Ls as well, such as the exception for

reporting of current events (Berne article 10(2)), which is subject to its own
internal test, namely “to the extent justified by the informatory purpose.” Some

Berne E&Ls already incorporate a standard or limit, such as the need to show

compatibility with “fair practice.” 14 Put differently, in the Authors’ view the

TRIPS version of the test applies to new rights (e.g. the rental right in TRIPS

articles 11 and 14.4), and to rights for which no specific E&L is provided in the
Convention, such as the so-called small exceptions. 15 Another question is the
interpretation of the test in TRIPS, because TRIPS has its own trade-based
context, as we discuss in Part II.

B. The three-step test in the WIPO Copyright Treaty

The preamble of the WCT supports this analysis. It stresses the necessity
…to maintain a balance between the rights of authors and the larger
public interest, particularly education, research and access to information,
as reflected in the Berne Convention. 16
The understanding of the three step test as a flexible framework for the adoption
of E&Ls at the national level emerges quite clearly in the WIPO “Internet
Berne Convention, art. 10(1).
D. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement; Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed., London: Sweet &
Maxwell 2012, at 280-282.
16 See the preamble of the WCT. The WPPT contains a similar formulation in its preamble. The
issue had already been addressed in the basic proposal for the later WCT. See WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/4, § 12.09. Moreover, it was raised in the course of the deliberations of Main
Committee I. See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, 72 and 74. Cf. as to the reference to the Berne
Convention (‘as reflected in the Berne Convention’), A. Françon, “La conférence diplomatique sur
certaines questions de droit d’auteur et de droits voisins”, Revue Internationale du Droit
d’Auteur 1997, p. 3 (9); S. Ricketson, “The Boundaries of Copyright: Its Proper E&Ls :
International Conventions and Treaties”, Intellectual Property Quarterly 1999, p. 56 (61); H.
Cohen Jehoram, “Some Principles of Exceptions to Copyright”, in: P. Ganea/C. Heath/G. Schricker
(eds.), Urheberrecht Gestern – Heute – Morgen, Festschrift für Adolf Dietz zum 65. Geburtstag,
München: C.H. Beck 2001, p. 382.
14

15 See
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treaties, 17 and specifically in the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 WCT,
which announces:

It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital
environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have
been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these
provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise
new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network
environment. It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor
extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions
permitted by the Berne Convention.
The expressed concern of the international community of preserving the

relevance of limitations and exceptions in a changing technological environment

may be considered evidence of a shared recognition of the value of flexibility in
crafting appropriate E&Ls. Indeed, the basic proposal for the WCT already noted
in that regard that,

…when a high level of protection is proposed, there is reason to balance
such protection against other important values in society. Among these
values are the interests of education, scientific research, the need of the
general public for information to be available in libraries and the interests
of persons with a handicap that prevents them from using ordinary
sources of information. 18

The Minutes of Main Committee I in its deliberations concerning E&Ls in the

WCT/WPPT context mirror this determination to shelter a number of key use

privileges. The United States delegation, for example, sought to safeguard the fair
use doctrine. 19 Denmark feared that the new rules under discussion could

become “a ‘straight jacket’ for existing exceptions in areas that were essential for
17 The

WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT),
18 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4, § 12.09.
19 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, § 488.
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society.” 20 Many delegations opposed a version of Article 10(2) WCT that would

have subjected extant E&Ls under the Berne Convention to the three-step test

potentially in a new way. 21 Korea unequivocally suggested the deletion of
paragraph 2 22 – a proposal that was approved by a number of other
delegations. 23 Singapore, for instance, elaborated that the second paragraph was

…inconsistent with the commitment to balance copyright laws, where
E&Ls adopted by the Conference were narrowed, and protection was
made broader. 24
Hence, the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 can be viewed as the

outcome of an international debate during which the need to maintain an
appropriate balance in copyright law was clearly articulated. Against this

background, the three-step test contained in Article 10 WCT can be seen as a

guideline for the future extension of existing E&Ls, and also as enabling new
exemptions in the digital environment ([Article 10] “should be understood to

permit Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are
appropriate in the digital network environment.”) The Agreed Statement also
maintains the legality of Berne-compatible E&Ls without changing the role of the
test in that context. 25

20 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, § 489.
21

See, for instance, the statements made by the delegations of Denmark, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/102, § 489, New Zealand, ibid., § 495, and Sweden, ibid., § 497. See for the text of the
draft provision the end of the previous subsection.
22 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, § 491.
23 See, for instance, the statements made by the delegations of Hungary, WIPO Doc.
CRNR/DC/102, § 493, and China, ibid., § 500.
24 See WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, § 492.
25 The Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (VIP Treaty) signed on 27 June, 2013, is important
because it explicitly refers to the different versions of the “three-step test” in international
copyright law. Article 11 of the treaty makes it clear that there are many versions and that an
E&L authorized under the treaty must comply with all versions by which a country is bound i.e.
under the Berne Convention, the TRIPS Agreement and the WIPO Copyright Treaty, including
their interpretative agreements. This arguably supports interpretations of the test(s) in TRIPS,
for example, that differ at least somewhat from earlier interpretations of the test under Berne,
even though it is to be taken into account that the WIPO Copyright Treaty, according to its Article
1(1), is a special agreement within the meaning of Article 20 of Berne, and that WTO panels may
rely on the Berne acquis when it comes to the interpretation of the three-step test in Article 13
TRIPS. This approach has been taken by the WTO panel dealing with Section 110(5) of the US
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Part II – Interpretation of the Three-Step Test

Considering the historical background to the introduction of the three-step test
at the international level, it becomes apparent that it is precisely the broad and
relatively vague formulation of the provision that ensured its success during the

Berne, TRIPS and WCT/WPPT negotiations. At the time of the negotiations of

each instrument, there were some countries, like the U.S., in which the balance

achieved in the copyright system was promoted in large part through an open
general clause permitting uses to be considered “fair” subject to a balancing test.
Other countries, including many in the civil law tradition but not confined to

such countries, promoted balance through closed lists of specific E&Ls. The

open-ended wording of the three-step test allowed settling the sensitive question

of E&Ls in a way that countries of both the open clause and closed list traditions

could accept.

For quite some time after the inclusion in various international treaties, the

three-step test did not receive much attention. Its full impact on national
legislation remained mostly speculative. That changed on 15 June 2000 26, when
a WTO dispute-settlement panel found that Section 110(5)(B) of the US

Copyright Act, which exonerates certain commercial establishments such as bars
or restaurants that use non-dramatic musical works from copyright royalty

payments, particularly when using only “homestyle” audio equipment, violated
all three steps of the test as incorporated into Article 13 TRIPS. 27 It became clear

Copyright Act. In its Report of the Panel, WTO Document WT/DS160/R, available at www.wto.org,
para. 6.62, the panel explicitly held that the inclusion of Berne provisions by virtue of Article 9.1
TRIPS included the Berne acquis: “If that incorporation should have covered only the text of
Articles 1–21 of the Berne Convention (1971), but not the entire Berne acquis relating to these
articles, Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement would have explicitly so provided.”
26 Panel Rep. of 15 June 2000, United States-Article 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act,
WT/DS160/R.
27 Concerning this decision, see e.g., M.R.F. Senftleben, “Towards a Horizontal Standard for
Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? WTO Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in
Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark Law”, International Review of
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 407; J.C. Ginsburg, “Towards
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then that the three-step test had to be taken seriously. In fact, suddenly, due to
this interpretation of the panel, the three-step test became one of the main, if not

the main issue, when trying to find a fair balance of interest in copyright law and
policy.

While we do not wish to reexamine the panel’s report in detail here, it is

essential to indicate how the policy space of national legislators could be unduly

curtailed if some of the approach taken by the panel in that dispute was applied
too mechanically in future cases. We will show that a different result can be
reached by choosing a different interpretation of the requirements laid down in
the three-step test.

A. The Interpretation of the test by the WTO Panel in the 110(5) case

According to the dispute-settlement panel, the first condition of the test (namely
the requirement of a “certain special case” or that an exception be “limited” 28),

implies that “an exception or limitation in national legislation must be clearly
defined” (which corresponds to the requirement of a “certain” case) and then

that it has “an individual or limited application or purpose” (which corresponds

to the requirement of a “special” case). The WTO panel drew a significant
distinction between the words “certain” and “special”. It interpreted the term
“certain” to mean that an E&L had to be clearly defined, though there was no

supranational copyright law? The WTO Panel decision and the ‘three-step test’ for copyright
exceptions”, 187 RIDA 2 (2001); A. Lucas, “Le ‘triple test’ de l’article 13 de l’Accord ADPIC à la
lumière du rapport du Groupe spécial de l’OMC ‘Etats-Unis Article 110 (5) de la Loi sur le droit
d’auteur’”, in: P. Ganea, C. Heath, G. Schricker (eds.), Urheberrecht, Gestern – Heute – Morgen,
Mélanges A. Dietz, 423 (Beck, Munich 2001); B.C. Goldmann, “Victory for Songwriters in WTO
Music-Royalties Dispute Between US and EU - Background of the Conflict Over the Extension of
Copyright Homestyle Exemption”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition
Law 32 (2001), p. 412; D.J. Brennan, “The Three-Step Test Frenzy-Why the TRIPS Panel Decision
might be considered Per Incuriam”, 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 212 (2002); P.B. Hugenholtz,
“De wettelijke beperkingen beperkt. De WTO geeft de driestappentoets tanden”, 2000 Tijdschrift
voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 10; J. Oliver, “Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision
on the Three-Step Test”, 25 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 119 (2002); M. Ficsor, “How much
of what? The ‘three-step test’ and its application in two recent WTO dispute settlement cases”,
192 RIDA 111 (2002); Y. Gaubiac, “Les exceptions au droit d’auteur : un nouvel avenir, l’OMC
statue sur les exceptions au droit d’auteur”, June 2001 Comm. com. électr. 12.; A. Kur, “Of Oceans,
Islands, and Inland Water- How much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the Three-step
Test?”, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8 (2009), p. 287.
28 “Certain special cases” is used in Berne article 9(2) and TRIPS article 13; ”limited” is used
instead in TRIPS articles 17, 26.2 and 30.
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need “to identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which the

exception could apply, provided that the scope of the exception was known and

particularised.” 29 On its merits, the panel thus regarded the word “certain” as a
guarantee of a sufficient degree of legal certainty. 30

From the term “special”, the panel derived the additional requirement that an

E&L should be narrow in a quantitative as well as a qualitative sense. 31 It

summarized this twofold requirement as narrowness in “scope and reach”. 32 Its
application to the business exemption and the homestyle exemption of section
110(5) shows that, pursuant to the panel’s conception, it is particularly the

number of potential beneficiaries that must be sufficiently limited in order to
comply with the quantitative aspect of specialness. 33 As to the qualitative aspect,
the panel eschewed an inquiry into the legitimacy of the public policy purpose

underlying the adoption of the E&L at hand. 34 In the panel’s view, the qualitative

aspect of the specialness requirement did not mean that an E&L must necessarily

serve a special purpose under article 13 TRIPS. 35 Instead, the panel raised
conceptual qualitative issues such as the categories of works affected by an E&L

and the circumstances under which it may be invoked.

The second step of the test has the potential to restrict the freedom of national
legislation to enact new E&Ls considerably more. That step is the prohibition of a
conflict with a “normal exploitation” of the work. In the panel’s report in the
29 See

Report of the Panel, 15 June 2000, WTO Document WT/DS160/R, online available at
www.wto.org, para. 6.108.
30 The panel held, for instance, that the term “homestyle equipment” was sufficiently clear and
that detailed technical specifications were not necessary. See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.145.
31 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.109. Cf. A. Lucas, “Le ‘triple test’ de l’article 13 de l’Accord ADPIC
à la lumière du rapport du Groupe spécial de l’OMC ‘Etats-Unis – Article 110 (5) de la loi sur le
droit d’auteur’, in: Ganea/Heath/Schricker (eds.), Urheberrecht Gestern – Heute – Morgen,
Festschrift für Adolf Dietz zum 65. Geburtstag, München 2001, 423 (430), who insists on the
combination of both aspects of speciality to ensure a sufficiently rigid standard of control.
32 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.112.
33 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.127 and 6.143.
34 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.111.
35 See WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.112. Cf. J.C. Ginsburg, “Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The
WTO Panel Decision and the ‘Three-Step Test’ for Copyright Exceptions”, RIDA 2001, p. 13; S.
Ricketson, “The three-step test, deemed quantities, libraries and closed exceptions”, Centre for
Copyright Studies, Strawberry Hills NSW 2002, p. 31.
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110(5) case, the criterion of normal exploitation was deemed to involve
consideration of the forms of exploitation that currently generate income for the

right holder as well as those which, in all probability, are likely to be of
considerable importance in the future.

36

While this interpretation is

understandable, it implies certain risks. On the one hand, it could impose a status
quo and prevent any extension of extant E&Ls to new situations unforeseen by
the letter of the text, but which could be derived from its spirit. On the other

hand, any reference to future forms of exploitation runs the risk of restricting
policy space for exceptions every time a technical evolution allows control of

previously uncontrollable uses and thus creates new possibilities for

exploitation. 37 Bearing in mind the possibilities for right holders to control the
uses of their works through technical measures, in the long run, this could even
significantly restrict E&Ls in the digital environment. 38

The third step of the test, by contrast, offers considerable flexibility for the

balancing of competing interests. It asks whether an E&L “unreasonably

prejudices legitimate interests of the author” (Berne Convention and WCT) or

“copyright holder” (TRIPS). Under this final step, not each and every potential

interest of authors and right holders are relevant. Only legitimate interests are to
be factored into the equation. Such legitimacy is context-dependent.

Furthermore, not each and every prejudice to legitimate interests is relevant.
Only unreasonable prejudices are inacceptable. The third step, therefore, offers

several filters that transform it into a refined proportionality test: the legitimacy
36 WTO Panel, ibid., para. 6.180.
37 In

this sense also M. Buydens and S. Dusollier, “Les exceptions au droit d’auteur : évolutions
dangereuses”, Comm. com. électr. Sept. 2001, at 13; J.C. Ginsburg, “Toward Supranational
Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the ‘Three-Step Test’ for Copyright Exceptions”,
RIDA 2001, at 48, underlining the risk that “the traditionally free uses, such as for training
purposes or parody, be considered as normal exploitations, supposing that right holders manage
to implement a profitable collecting system”.
38 See also M. Buydens and S. Dusollier, “Les exceptions au droit d’auteur: évolutions
dangereuses”, Comm. com. électr. Sept. 2001, at 12; C. Geiger, “Droit d’auteur et droit du public à
l’information, approche de droit compare”, (Paris, Litec, 2004) at 357. See C. Geiger, J. Griffiths
and R.M. Hilty, “Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-step test’ in Copyright Law”,
2008 European Intellectual Property Review 489, stating that under the interpretation of the WTO
Panel, “the second step of the ‘test’ becomes a form of ‘show-stopper’, precluding law-makers
from taking into account any interests other than the private economic interests of right-holders”.

– 15 –

of the interests invoked by authors and right holders are to be weighed against

the reasons justifying the use privilege. As the above-cited example of copying
for various purposes given at the 1967 Stockholm Conference shows, the
payment of equitable remuneration further enhances the space for refined
solutions in this context.

In the 110(5) case, the flexibility inherent in the third step did not come to the
fore clearly. The panel noted that the term “legitimate” related not only to
“lawfulness from a legal positivist perspective” but also to “legitimacy from a

more normative perspective.” 39 In its own analysis, however, the panel
contented itself with “one – albeit arguably incomplete– way of looking at
legitimate interests” in terms of “the economic value of the exclusive rights

conferred by copyright on their holders.” 40 The panel clarified, however, that this

did not mean “to say that legitimate interests are necessarily limited to this

economic value”, thereby referring to a prior patent report in which another
WTO panel had developed the formula of the justification of interests in the light
of “public policies or other social norms”. 41

The panel in the 110(5) case may have believed that its focus on the economic

value of copyrights was a facet of the broader normative concept adopted by the
patent panel but then chose not to discuss these conceptual questions in more
detail because its analysis was confined to the interest in the economic value of

the rights. In the absence of any objections raised by the parties, this interest
could readily be qualified as “legitimate” and the panel may have felt that it
needed go no further for the purposes of that dispute. 42

With regard to the question of the not unreasonable nature of the prejudice, the
panel in the same case noted that “a certain amount of prejudice has to be
39 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.224.
40 See

WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.227. Cf. HEIDE, The Berne Three-Step Test and the
Proposed Copyright Directive, EIPR 1999, 105 (107), who warns of the reduction of the threestep test to an “economic prejudice test”. For an analysis of the Berne negotiating history forming
the background to the panel’s approach focusing on legal interests, see FICSOR, fn. 2, 141-147.
41 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.227 together with footnote 202. Cf. WTO Panel –
Patents, fn. 1, para. 7.69.
42 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.226.
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presumed justified as ‘not unreasonable’.” 43 It concluded that “prejudice to the

legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception
or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income

to the copyright owner.” 44 The starting point for scrutinizing Section 110(5) of

the US Copyright Act was thus similar to the theoretical basis on which the panel
had already conducted its analysis of normal exploitation. 45 In these

circumstances, the flexibility of the third step – its full potential to serve as a

proportionality test – remained unexplored by the panel to a significant degree.
B. Possible Alternative Approaches

The predominantly economic interpretation chosen by the WTO panel in the
110(5) case was criticized for not taking sufficiently into account the diverse

social, economic and cultural policy objectives of WTO Members. 46 A more
policy-based reading of the second step was proposed by a number of scholars

and commentators. 47 In the specific context of the TRIPS Agreement, such a
normative interpretation may rely on the objectives and principles laid down in

the Agreement’s preamble and in arts. 7 and 8. 48 In the context of public
43 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.229.
44 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.229.

45 See WTO Panel – Copyright, fn. 2, para. 6.265 and 6.272.
46 For

a normative approach of the second step, see also J.C. Ginsburg, “Toward Supranational
Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the ‘Three-Step Test’ for Copyright Exceptions”,
RIDA 2001, at 23; S. Ricketson and J.C. Ginsburg, “International Copyright and Neighbouring
Rights- The Berne Convention and Beyond”, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, §
13.21, stating that the second step requires to take into account “non-economic as well as
economic normative considerations”.
47 According to Christophe Geiger, this normative approach could also be derived from
fundamental rights obligations resulting from international law. For example, the socio-cultural
dimension of copyright law, predominant in Article 27 UDHR and Article 15 ICESCR, should be
reflected in the interpretation of the international three step test (see C. Geiger, “Exploring the
Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement Provisions on Limitations and Exceptions”, in: A. Kur et V.
Mizaras (eds.), The Structure of Intellectual Property Law- Can One Size Fit All?, Cheltenham,
UK/Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2011, at 287 sq.); C. Geiger, “The Social Function of
Intellectual Property Rights, Or how Ethics can Influence the Shape and Use of IP law”, Max
Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law Research Paper No. 13-06,
forthcoming in: G.B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Intellectual Property Law: Methods and Perspectives,
Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2014). More detailed on this issue, see infra.
48 H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual
Property Protection”, in: P. Torremans (ed), “Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, 161
(Austin/Boston/Chicago/New York/ The Netherlands, Kluwer law International, 2008), at 162.
This author lists the concept of “normal exploitation” among the open provisions to be
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international law, this approach is fully consistent with Article 31(1) of the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, stating that “a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to

the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”

(emphasis added). 49

Article 7 of TRIPS lays down a principle of balance between rights and
obligations and emphasizes that the Agreement has the goal of fostering not only
economic development, but also social welfare. This means that while

interpreting the provisions of TRIPS, a pure economic perspective should not be

followed to the exclusion of other values and objectives. 50 Article 8 TRIPS goes in
the same direction, as it allows Members to adopt measures for the promotion of

“the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and
technological development”. Then, the preamble to the TRIPS Agreement refers

not only to the objective of promoting adequate protection mechanisms. It also
recognizes the “underlying public policy objectives of national systems” and,

interpreted in the light of the TRIPS objectives specified in Article 7 and 8 of the Agreement. See
also in this sense C. Geiger, “Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement Provisions on
Limitations and Exceptions”, in: A. Kur et V. Mizaras (eds.), The Structure of Intellectual Property
Law- Can One Size Fit All?, Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2011. More
generally on this issue, see P.K. Yu, “The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement”, 46
Houston Law Review 979 sq. (2009).
49 See detailed on this issue S. Frankel, “WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules of
Interpretation of Public International Law’ to Intellectual Property”, 46 Virginia Journal of
International Law 365 (2006). See also the Doha declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health adopted by the Ministerial conference (WT/Min (01)/DEC/2, 20 November 2001), where
it is explicitly stated that “in applying the customary rules of interpretation of international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the
Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and principles” (art. 5 a).
50 See more detailed H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “A Comparative Analysis of Policy Space in WTO Law”
(November 26, 2008), Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law
Research Paper Series No. 08-02 (published under the title “Assessing the needs for a public
interest exception in the TRIPS Agreement”, in: A. Kur and M. Levin (eds.), “Intellectual Property
in a Fair World Trade System – Proposals for reforming TRIPS”, 167 (Cheltenham,
UK/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011); P. K. Yu, “The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS
Agreement”, 46 Houston Law Review 979 sq. (2009), stating that the TRIPS Agreement “includes a
number of flexibilities to facilitate development and to protect the public interest. To safeguard
these flexibilities, Article 7 and 8 provide explicit and important objectives and principles that
play important roles in the interpretation and the implementation of the Agreement”. He also
points out, following other commentators, that article 7 is a “should” provision and is contained
in the text of the Agreement and not in the Preamble, what gives it a higher weight in the process
of interpretation (see also in this sense UNCTAD-ICTDS, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at 123).
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with regard to least-developed countries, the needs “in respect of maximum
flexibility in the domestic implementation”. 51 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan has

also argued that there is a principle of proportionality in international trade law
that has to be respected while interpreting TRIPS. 52 “Proportionality” is a notion

mostly used in the context of issues of fundamental rights, especially as a method
to solve conflicts between different values at stake. 53

One may find some support for this approach in the field of patent law. The WTO

panel dealing with the protection of pharmaceutical products in Canada noted in

its report that “both the goals and the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1
must obviously be borne in mind when (examining the wording of the provision)

as well as those of other provisions in the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its
object and purposes” 54. In the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case, the WTO panel thus

seemed to adhere to a more normative, policy-based approach in interpreting

article 30 TRIPS – the three-step test version applicable to exceptions to patent
rights. 55 According to the report, “exploitation” should be considered “normal”
51 More

detailed on the preamble and its impact on the interpretation of the Agreement, see D.
Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed., 159-164 (Sweet and Maxwell,
London 2012).
52 H. Grosse Ruse-Khan, “Proportionality and Balancing within the Objectives for Intellectual
Property Protection”, in: P. Torremans (ed), “Intellectual Property and Human Rights”, 161
(Austin/Boston/Chicago/New York/ The Netherlands, Kluwer law International, 2008). See also
M. Andenas and S. Zleptnig, “Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative
perspective”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 2007, Vol. 20, Issue 1, 71 sq, discussing
the concepts of proportionality, necessity and balancing in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
legal framework; A. Kur, “Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water- How much Room for Exceptions
and Limitations under the Three-step Test?”, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8
(2009), p. 287, stating with reference to Art. XX GATT that “the need to interpret the three-step
test in the light of proportionality considerations cannot be emphasized enough”.
53 C. Geiger, “‘Constitutionalizing’ Intellectual Property Law, The Influence of Fundamental Rights
on Intellectual Property in Europe”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition
Law 37 (2006), p. 371; “Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU Level”, in: E. Derclaye
(ed), “Research Handbook on the Future of EU Copyright”, 27 (Cheltenham, UK/Northampton,
MA, Edward Elgar, 2009); “Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and
International) Intellectual Property Law”, in: A. Ohly (ed.), “Common Principles of European
Intellectual Property Law”, 223 (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2012); “‘Humanising’ the Intellectual
Property System - Securing a Fair Balance of Interests through Fundamental Rights at European
and International Level”, The Quarterly Review of Corporation Law and Society (Waseda
University), Sept. 2012, Issue 33, 291.
54 WTO Panel Report of March 17, 2000, Canada - Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,
WT/DS114/R, §7.26.
55 Article 30 TRIPS: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred
by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
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when it is “essential to the achievement of the goals of patent policy.” 56 That

formulation remains somewhat vague, but it seems to provide the possibility for

the legislature to take relevant policy considerations into account instead of
confining the analysis to a strictly economic approach 57.

Admittedly, the wording of the second step (in the version contained in TRIPS
article 30) is different from the parallel criterion in the copyright provision set
forth in article 13 of TRIPS or 9(2) of the Berne Convention. It seems to suggest

more clearly that a conflict with a normal exploitation can be justified under a

policy-based approach. Under Article 30, “exceptions must not unreasonably

conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent”. Similarly, according to Article
26.2 TRIPS, “members may provide limited exceptions to the protection of

industrial designs, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
with the normal exploitation of protected industrial designs” (emphasis added).

The explicit reference to a notion such as the “reasonableness” of the second step

restriction allows more easily the factoring in of interests beyond those of right

holders 58. Article 26.2 and 30 of TRIPS thus seem to allow a more flexible
application of the test. However, there is no stated reason in TRIPS to explain

why restrictions to the rights of the owner of a patent or of an industrial design
should be treated differently from those of the owner of authors’
rights/copyright. 59

exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
56 WTO Panel Report of 17 March 2000, supra, § 7.58. On this report, see M.R.F. Senftleben,
“Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? WTO Panel Reports
Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related Tests in Patent and Trademark
Law”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 407.
57 More generally, for an analysis of exclusions to Patent Law provisions in TRIPS from an
international Human Rights perspective, see H. M. Haugen, “Human Rights and TRIPS Exclusion
and Exception Provisions”, 5/6 Journal of World Intellectual Property 345 (2009).
58 See Part I.
59 As A. Kur, “Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water- How much Room for Exceptions and
Limitations under the Three-step Test?”, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8 (2009), p.
287, interestingly points out, the drafting history of the TRIPS agreement also does not offer an
explanation as to why these differences in wording occurred and whether they were intended to
have a special meaning.
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Future WTO panels dealing with the three-step test are not formally bound by

the approach taken in the report on Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, for
there is no formal principle of stare decisis in WTO law.

60

That said, a kind of

“WTO jurisprudence” is emerging. Understandably, dispute-settlement panels
strive to maintain consistency with previous reports and frequently refer in

great detail to findings of prior panels. 61 Yet, as pointed out by Professor Jackson,

there are “several specific instances in the GATT jurisprudence, where panels

have consciously decided to depart from the results of a prior panel.” 62 Therefore,
it cannot be assumed that the panel report on Section 110(5) poses an
insurmountable hurdle for future panels seeking to recalibrate the three-step
test as interpreted in 2000 in the 110(5) case. Future panel reports may wish to
identify which features of the interpretation by that panel are lasting and which

may not be, and which principles should be identified as established rules of

interpretation. A report by the Appellate Body of course, due to its heighted
position in the WTO hierarchy, could truly proceed de novo on the issue.

A future panel or the Appellate Body, should they wish to refine the approach

developed in the report on Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, could rely on

the alternative approaches suggested since 2000 in in-depth analyses of the
nature and function of the three-step test in international copyright law. Article

31(3) (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 63 , requires that “any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the

parties” should be taken into account. 64 A more flexible, normative approach to
60 See

in general I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998,
at 19-22. Cf. J.H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO – Insights on Treaty Law and
Economic Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, at 127; P.E. Geller,
60“Geistiges Eigentum auf dem Weltmarkt: Welche Bedeutung hat die Streitbeilegung nach
TRIPS?”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht Internationaler Teil 1995, 935 (943).
61 Panel reports might refer to so-called “dispute settlement practice”. See for instance WTO
Panel – Copyright 2000, §§ 6.13, 6.111, 6.162, 6.185, 6.231.
62 See J.H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO – Insights on Treaty Law and Economic
Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000, at 127.
63 United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 1155, 331. However, it is true that some important WTO
members such as the USA have not ratified the Vienna convention.
64 See S. Frankel, “WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law’ to Intellectual Property”, 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 365 (2006),

– 21 –

the three-step test might also be illuminated by international obligations

resulting from treaties protecting human rights and fundamental rights. 65

International obligations can result, for example, from the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and the International Covenant on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 19 December 1966. Both may be seen as

providing guidelines for the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement, and
therefore also of the three-step test. 66 Given the ethical questions involved in at

least some E&Ls, it is hard to completely exclude the relevance of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, for example. Indeed, while the exact interaction of

the TRIPS Agreement and the UDHR is unclear, a number of scholars have gone

so far as to argue that there is primacy of international human rights acts over

trade liberalization rules that makes it mandatory that trade rules be interpreted

in the light of the UDHR. 67 Furthermore, the UN Sub-Commission on Human

at 420, underlining that “Art. 31 (3)(c) is not limited to rules in relation to intellectual property
law, but all rules of international law” and that therefore the “open-textured nature of some
TRIPS Agreement carve-outs may call for other areas of international law to be treated as part of
the context for interpretation”.
65 On the interaction between IP and international human rights provisions see L.R. Helfer and G.
Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property, Mapping the Global interface, Cambridge, CUP,
2011; L.R. Helfer, “Three Approaches for Reconciling Human Rights and Intellectual Property
Rights”, in: ALADDA (ed.), “Copyright and Freedom of Expression, ALAI Study Days 2006”,
ALADDA, Barcelona, 2008, at 116. According to this author, it is certain “that the rules,
institutions, and discourse of international human rights are now increasingly relevant to
intellectual property law and policy and that the two fields, once isolated from each other, are
becoming ever more closely intertwined”. See also in this sense from the same author: “Towards
A Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property”, U.C. Davis Law Review 2007, Vol. 40, 971
and P. K. Yu, “Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework”,
U.C. Davis Law Review 2007, Vol. 40, 1039); “Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property
and Human Rights”, Georgia State University Law Review 2007, Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 709; N. Bronzo,
“Propriété intellectuelle et droits fondamentaux” (L’Harmattan, Paris 2007); C. Geiger, “The
Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property”, in: P. Torremans (ed.), “Intellectual Property
and Human Rights”, 101 (Austin/Boston/Chicago/New York, The Netherlands, Kluwer Law
International, 2008); C. Geiger (ed.), “Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual
Property”, (Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, forthcoming 2014).
66 See S. Frankel, “WTO Application of ‘the Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public
International Law’ to Intellectual Property”, 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 365 (2006),
at 420, underlining that “Art. 31 (3)(c) is not limited to rules in relation to intellectual property
law, but all rules of international law” and that therefore the “open-textured nature of some
TRIPS Agreement carve-outs may call for other areas of international law to be treated as part of
the context for interpretation”.
67 See e.g. the article of G. Marceau, Counselor for the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO
Secretariat: “WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights”, 13 European Journal of International
Law 753 sq. (2002), and from the same author: “The WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights”,
in: F.M. Abbott, C. Breining-Kaufmann & T. Cottier (eds.), “International Trade and Human Rights:
Foundations and Conceptual Issues”, World Trade Forum, Vol. 5 (Ann Arbor, University of
Michigan Press, 2005), chapter 10; R. Howse and M. Mutua, “Protecting Human Rights in a Global
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Rights in its resolutions has, on several occasions, urged the World Trade
Organization in general, and the Council on TRIPS during its ongoing review of

the TRIPS Agreement in particular, “to take fully into account the existing State
obligations under international human rights instruments” (emphasis added). 68

We should note before moving to the third step that some scholars have

proposed to adopt, in addition to a policy-based approach, a restrictive approach
to the notion of ‘normal exploitation of a work’ [in the second step], in order to
avoid depriving national legislatures and judges of the policy space necessary to

strike a proper balance between copyright protection and competing social,

cultural and economic needs 69. They have argued that a restrictive reading of the

Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization”, Executive summary (Montreal, Rights &
Democracy, International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development 2000), arguing
“that trade and human rights regimes need not be in conflict, so long as the trade regime is
interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the human rights obligations of states. This
interpretation respects the hierarchy of norms in international law, where human rights, to the
extent that they have the status of custom in international law, and certainly where they have the
status of preemptory norms, will normally prevail over specific, conflicting provisions of any
treaties including trade agreements”. Arguing in favor of prioritized value of the human right to
health, see L. Forman, “An Elementary Consideration of Humanity? Linking Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights to the Human Right to Health in International Law”, Journal of World
Intellectual Property 2011, Vol. 14, No. 2, 155.
68 Resolution 2000/7 of the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, 17 August 2000, on
“Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights” (E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2000/7). See also in this
sense Resolution 2001/21 of the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, 16 August 2001
(E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/21).
69 According to Martin Senftleben, conflict with normal exploitation should occur only if “the
author is deprived from a current or potential market of considerable economic and practical
importance” (M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the
Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer
Law International 2004, at 193). The notion of normal exploitation would then cover, as rightly
underlined by Séverine Dusollier, only “the main avenues of the exploitation of the work, i.e.
those which constitute the author’s major sources of income” (S. Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et
protection des œuvres dans l’univers numérique, Larcier: Bruxelles 2005, p. 220). This author adds
that “to reason otherwise would make the exceptions lose their meaning and gradually
disappear.” See also in this sense A. Lucas, “For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step
Test”, European Intellectual Property Review 2010, p. 278 sq, stating that the definition of the
normal exploitation should take into account “the potential effect of the exception only if these
effects are suited to deprive the right owners of substantial gains” (emphasis added); J. Griffiths,
“The ‘Three-step test’ in European Copyright Law - Problems and Solutions”, 2009 Intellectual
Property Quarterly at 457, according to whom “there is strong arguments that a conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work should only be regarded as arising where an author or copyright
owner is deprived of an extensive share of his or her potential market”. He concludes that the test
should only be considered “as a form of long-stop, a loose constraint prohibiting only exceptions
that would generally be acknowledged to be unjustifiable”.
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second step is particularly necessary if a sequential (or “step-by-step”) approach

is followed. 70

This takes us to the third step of the test, which some see as the most important
one because it requires an examination of the justification that underlies the E&L

at issue. Under the third step, copyright E&Ls must be prevented from causing an
unreasonable prejudice to the legitimate interests of the right holder. 71 This

language indicates that the right holder is not intended to have the power to

control all uses of her works, as some degree of prejudice may be justified in
light of values deemed superior to or balanced against legitimate interests of the

right holder. 72 It also suggests that some interests may not be legitimate in this

context. Given those safeguards, the formulation of the third step allows WTO

Members to use a proportionality test, 73 as is often done to settle conflicts

between fundamental rights. 74 A legislature or judge applying the test must

consider the justification behind the E&L and come to a differentiated analysis in
light of the many interests at stake.

Those who support a reading of the three-step test that departs from the 110(5)

panel report often point to the fact that national courts have started to interpret

the test in a more liberal manner than the WTO panel, sometimes insisting on the
70 Although,

as we will show below, we don’t think that such an approach is dictated by the
international three-step test, at least clearly not in its post Berne context.
71 According to its authoritative French version, the term “unreasonable” would have to be read
as “unjustified” at least in the context of the Berne Convention where, as we have seen above in
Part I, the French version of the text prevails.
72 Reasoning on the basis of conflicting fundamental rights, the German Constitutional Court
specified this very clearly in its “School Book” decisions of 7 July 1971, GRUR 1972, 481.
73 M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step
Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law
International 2004, at 226; S. Dusollier, Droit d’auteur et protection des œuvres dans l’univers
numérique, Larcier: Bruxelles 2005, p. 221. See also D. Gervais, “Towards a New Core
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test”, 9 Marquette Intellectual Property
Law Review 1 sq. (2005), stating “that the inclusion of a reasonableness/justifiability criterion is a
key that allows legislators to establish a balance between on the one hand, the rights of authors
and copyright holders, and the needs and interests of users, on the other hand”; C. Geiger, “The
Three-Step Test, A Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?”, International Review of Intellectual
Property and Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 683 (696).
74 C. Geiger, “The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the
Information Society”, e-Copyright Bulletin January-March 2007, at 18; “Fundamental Rights, a
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potential of the three test criteria to serve – in an enabling sense – as a basis for

the adoption of national E&Ls. 75 Some of these decisions are discussed in Part IV
below.

A number of doctrinal proposals to “rethink” the three-step test more holistically

along those lines have been put forward. It was proposed, for example, when
evaluating the compatibility of an E&L with the test, to examine it in reverse, that
is, to start with the third step, the second step being examined afterwards as a

corrective measure to eliminate abusive conflicts with the exploitation of the
work. 76 It has been argued that the comparison of the wording of article 13

TRIPS with other TRIPS provisions modeled on the three-step test suggests that
the “third step” could be considered as the most important one. Article 17

(trademarks) for example provides for only one main criterion, namely to “take

account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third

parties” 77. The ‘psychological’ effect of a reverse reading of the steps of the test is
not negligible: after having balanced the different interests involved, a court or

Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?”, International Review of Intellectual
Property and Competition Law 2004, p. 277.
75 See e.g. the decision of the Swiss Supreme Court, 1st Civil Division, 26 June 2007, International
Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 39 (2008), p. 990. For a comment see C.
Geiger, “Rethinking Copyright Limitations in the Information Society: The Swiss Supreme Court
Leads the Way”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 39 (2008), p.
943; Court of Appeal of Barcelona (SAP), 17 September 2008. Commenting on recent cases in
Spain related to the test, one scholar even notes that “Spanish case law proves that the test can be
used by courts not to further ‘restrict’ the scope of a statutory exception but to provide for some
well-needed room to ‘manoeuvre’ in applying the exceptions to specific cases and scenarios” (R.
Xalabarder, “Fair Use in Spain. The EUCD Aftermath”, in: G. Ghidini and L.M. Genovesi (eds.),
“Intellectual Property and Market Power” 811 (Buenos Aires, EUDEBA, 2008). For a discussion of
many national court decisions on the three-step test, see J. Griffiths, “The ‘Three-Step Test’ in
European Copyright Law: Problems and Solutions”, Intellectual Property Quarterly 2009, p. 489.
For a discussion of the three-step test as a basis for flexible fair use legislation, see M.R.F.
Senftleben, “The International Three-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation”,
Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 67,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1723867.
76 See C. Geiger, “Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test, The Future of the Private Copy Exception in
the Digital Environment”, 2005 Computer Law Review international (CRi) 12; “The Three-Step
Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?”, International Review of Intellectual Property and
Competition Law 37 (2006), p. 683 (696); “The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of
Copyright Law to the Information Society”, e-Copyright Bulletin January-March 2007.
77 The full wording of Article 17 TRIPS is: “Members may provide limited exceptions to the rights
conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions
take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties”. The
first “step” is therefore still present through the reference to the need of providing only “limited”
exceptions. Anyhow, it has to be noted that no reference to the normal exploitation can be found.
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tribunal may be less inclined to prohibit the exception or E&L in question by
adopting a purely economic approach.

Another interpretation that has been proposed is to read the test as stating a

number of factors that need to be considered by the judge, based on the model of
the American fair use doctrine. 78 Those who support this approach draw a

parallel with the fourth factor contained in Article 107 of the US Copyright Act,

which codified the doctrine elaborated by US courts since the 19th century.

According to this fourth factor, the effect of the use on the potential market for or

value of the copyrighted work must be taken into account in determining

whether a particular use is fair. Similarly, one could say that the second step
(impact on normal exploitation of the work) is one of the criteria to take into

account during the analysis of the application of an exception or E&L, but not the

only one. Under this type of approach, the three-step test could be renamed the
“three-factor test”.

Whatever path is chosen to interpret the test, most observers agree that,

normatively, a just balance of the different interests involved should be

achieved. 79 This is especially true because, today, the test affects all debates

concerning the future of E&Ls to copyright. 80

C. The Declaration on a Balanced Interpretation
78 K.J. Koelman, “Fixing

the Three- Step Test”, European Intellectual Property Review 2006, p. 407;
M.R.F. Senftleben, “L’application du triple test: vers un système de fair use européen”, 2007 Propr.
Intell. 453, and from the same author: “Fair Use in the Netherlands - A Renaissance?”, 2009
Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht 1: “The adoption of a fair use system that rests
on the flexible, open criteria of a conflict with a normal exploitation and an unreasonable
prejudice to the legitimate interests would pave the way for this more flexible and balanced
application of the test” (at 7).
79 C. Geiger, “From Berne to National Law, via the Copyright Directive: The Dangerous Mutations
of the Three-Step Test”, European Intellectual Property Review 2007, p. 486; “The Role of the
Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the Information Society”, e-Copyright
Bulletin January-March 2007.
80 See the Green Paper “Copyright in the Knowledge Economy“ of the Commission of the
European Communities, COM(2008) 466/3, p. 5, stating that the three-step test “has become a
benchmark for all copyright limitations”. See further, in the EU context, C. Geiger and F.
Schönherr, “Defining the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to Reconsider the
Acquis regarding Limitations and Exceptions”, in: T.-E. Synodinou (ed.), Codification of European
Copyright Law, Challenges and Perspectives, Alphen aan den Rijn (NL), Kluwer Law International,
2012, p. 133.
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One can set against the background of possible alternative approaches the joint
project by the Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and
Tax Law and Queen Mary, University of London. The project brought together a

group of experts who elaborated a “declaration” aiming at securing a balanced
interpretation of the three-step test in copyright law 81. The aim of this

declaration was “to restore the ‘three-step test’ to its original role as a relatively

flexible standard precluding clearly unreasonable encroachments upon an
author’s rights without interfering unduly with the ability of legislators and

courts to respond to the challenges presented by shifting commercial and
technological contexts in a fair and balanced manner” 82.

The declaration starts by suggesting that the three-step test constitutes an

indivisible entirety and that the three steps are to be considered together and as
a whole in a comprehensive overall assessment (Article 1). It clarifies that the
requirement of a “certain special case” does not prevent legislators from

introducing open-ended E&Ls, so long as the scope of such E&Ls is reasonably
foreseeable (Article 3). It also proposes to adopt a normative understanding of

the concept of normal exploitation in taking into account the justification of the
E&L as well as the payment of an adequate compensation for the use of the work

(Article 4). Finally, it states that interests deriving from human rights and
fundamental freedoms, as well as interests in competition and other public

interests (scientific progress, cultural, social, or economic development) must be
taken into account when interpreting the three step test (Article 6). Since the

publication of this text, a number of additional interpretations have been
81

Declaration on a balanced interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law,
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2008, p. 707. On this
declaration, see C. Geiger, J. Griffiths and R.M. Hilty, “Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the
‘Three-step test’ in Copyright Law”, European Intellectual Property Review 2008, p. 489. The
declaration was published in the Netherlands (Tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- en informatierecht
2009, p. 8), in Germany (GRUR International 2008, 822), in France (Propr. intell. 2008, 399), in
Belgium (Auteurs et Médias 2008, 516), in Spain (Actas de derecho industrial y derecho de autor
2007-2008, Vol. 28, 1509), in Italy (Diritto informazione e informatica 2009, 159), in Portugal
(Direito da Sociedade da Informação 2009, Vol. 8, 471), in Brazil (Revista Trimestral de Direito
Civil July-September 2008, Vol. 35, 239), in Japan (Digital Content Association of Japan (DCAJ),
“Research on the introduction of fair-use provisions into Japanese copyright law”, Annual Report
of the Digital Content Association of Japan 2009, 69) and in Canada (Cahiers de Propriété
Intellectuelle 2012, Vol. 24, No. 1, 147).
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proposed in the specific context of the TRIPS Agreement, in part to extend this

balancing exercise in all areas of intellectual property 83.

The Declaration has also been subject to some critiques. It was asserted that the

proposed interpretation gave too much weight to the “public interest” and too
little to the interests of right holders and, therefore, was too far removed from

the original rationale underlying the test. 84 Another line of criticism was that the

overall assessment proposed by the Declaration was contrary both to the

wording and history of the test, which they saw as requiring a sequential

approach. As we noted in Part I, a more dynamic interpretation of the test may

be required now that the test has become an anchor for almost all TRIPS-

compatible E&Ls in the fields of copyright, designs and patents (arts. 13, 26.2 and
30, respectively), bearing in mind of course the textual differences among the
various versions.

According to one scholar, “it is sufficient to recall that the order of conditions (of
the two last conditions) was discussed at Stockholm and that the drafters have

explicitly indicated that one must not examine the third condition if the second
one is not fulfilled”. 85 This position is based on a reported statement of the
chairman of Main Committee I at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, Professor
Eugen Ulmer. He regarded the normal exploitation of the work as the first

essential of the three-step test while, from his point of view, the question of
prejudicing the legitimate interests of the author constituted merely a secondary
82 C. Geiger, J. Griffiths

and R.M. Hilty, “Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-step test’
in Copyright Law”, European Intellectual Property Review 2008, p. 489.
83 See A. Kur, “Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water- How much Room for Exceptions and
Limitations under the Three-step Test?”, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8 (2009), p.
287. Another reading has been also proposed by H. He, “Seeking a Balanced Interpretation for the
Three-Step Test: an Adjusted Structure in View of Divergent Approaches”, International Review of
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 40 (2009), p. 274; R. Wright, “The ‘Three-Step Test’
and the Wider Public Interest: Towards a More Inclusive Interpretation”, 2009 Journal of World
Intellectual Property 600.
84 A. Lucas, “For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test”, European Intellectual
Property Review 2010, p. 277 (278).
85 See A. Lucas, “For a Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test”, European Intellectual
Property Review 2010, p. 277 (281); M.J. Ficsor, “‘Munich Declaration’ on the three-step testRespectable
objective;
wrong
way
to
try
to
achieve
it”,
available
http://www.copyrightseesaw.net/archive/?sw_10_item=15.
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one. 86 The report on the work of Main Committee I noted in this vein that the
conditions were reversed to “afford a more logical order for the interpretation of

the rule”. 87 This explanation is followed by the practical example of

photocopying for various purposes cited above in Part I.

These statements made at the 1967 Stockholm Conference undoubtedly form

part of the drafting history underlying the adoption of the first three-step test in

international copyright law. However, they do not fully answer all questions

concerning the test. Put differently, one cannot derive the entire interpretation
from these statements. In the context of TRIPS, as was explained in the 110(5)

and Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel dispute-settlement reports, the Berne acquis
was incorporated in the Agreement with the consequence that the Berne drafting

history impacts the understanding of the three-step test. However, the TRIPS

Agreement has also its own objectives and principles that have to be taken into
account when interpreting its provisions, thus potentially leading to a more

nuanced reading. Moreover, a mechanical “step-by-step” approach is also

difficult to reconcile with the Agreed Statement in the context of the WIPO
copyright treaties of 1996 if the second step is used as a “show-stopper” for any

extension of E&Ls in the digital environment. 88

In our submission, the adoption with changes of the text in TRIPS, and the
Agreed Statement Concerning Article 10 WCT, suggest that a more flexible

approach is desirable. Regardless of the position taken on sequentiality or

holism, sequentiality must not be applied too rigidly, meaning that any miss

(even minor) at any of the steps means the E&L fails. A more integrated
approach should be followed that does not disregard the connection between the
three criteria. In other words, even if one decides to apply each step

independently and/or sequentially, the steps should not be treated as completely
86 See

WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Geneva: WIPO 1971, Minutes of Main Committee I, p. 885, and Doc. S/238, p. 720.
87 See WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Geneva: WIPO 1971, Report on the Work of Main Committee I, p. 1145.
88 This was the case in ahighly problematic decision of the French Supreme Court of 28 February 2006
(Cass. 1st Civil Division, 28 February 2006, IIC 37 (2006), p. 760)where the Court simply stopped the
analysis of the test after concluding abstractly that the private copy of a DVD conflicts with the normal
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separate. Instead, the answer provided under each step even in a distinct
analysis should be combined in the final result.

Operationally, if a challenged E&L easily passes two of the steps but is slightly

below the threshold for the third, then the E&L could be said to pass the test,

bearing in mind that, analytically, there is some degree of overlap between the

steps. What may be a small potential miss on one of the steps may thus be

compensated by demonstrating that an impugned E&L is clearly valid under the

other two. E&Ls for access by visually-impaired users are both “special” under
the first step and strongly supported at the normative level, which is mostly

relevant under the third step but should also influence the assessment under the
second step. Even if some have argued that there might be interference with

some commercial exploitation of Braille copies of books, the encroachment

seems fairly limited and does not vitiate the “core” exploitation of books by

authors and publishers. To take another example, an E&L for a specific purpose
such as limited copying to increase access to books in schools would likely pass

the first and third step. Consideration under the second and third step could be
given to whether the books at issue are designed for schools (where the case for

interference and prejudice may be much stronger) as opposed to material
designed for other markets, for which a fine-grained analysis of the evidence
would be required.

The WTO disputes-settlement panels have not had to deal with such a fact

pattern (the US E&L under attack in the 110(5) case was deemed to fail on all
three steps). In fact, the Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel did not exclude that the
steps could overlap. 89 This approach might pave the way for a future panel or

the Appellate Body to refine its approach in a closer case.

exploitation of the work and thus violate the second step. On this decision, see C. Geiger, ‘The ThreeStep Test, A Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?’, IIC 37 (2006), p. 683,
89
Canada-Pharmaceuticals, loc. cit. para 7.76.
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Part III – Room for open ended E&Ls
As demonstrated in Part II, the open-ended wording of the three-step test

supports flexible approaches seeking to strike an appropriate balance in
copyright law, such as allowing for “fair uses”. Restrictive interpretations of the

test, however, have cast doubt upon the compliance with the test of open-ended
national doctrines such as US-style fair use, as well as with more open and
flexible versions of “fair dealing” standards in place in a number of common law

jurisdictions. It has been asserted, for instance, that fair use and fair dealing
systems did not qualify as “certain special cases.” 90 Insofar as this line of

reasoning aims to discredit the mechanism traditionally used to delineate

exclusive rights in “open clause”-countries – that is, court determinations case by
case based upon a set of principles and/or rules –, the possibility of a conflict

between the open clause law approach and the three-step test must be examined
closely, especially in light of the drafting history described in Part I.

There are at least three elements to consider in that context. First, the three-step
test itself is an open-ended norm. Like the US fair use doctrine codified in section

107 of the US Copyright Act, it establishes a set of abstract criteria. Second,
parallels between the criteria of the three-step test and the factors to be found in

fair use can be drawn. As noted above, the prohibition of a conflict with a normal

exploitation parallels the fourth factor of the US fair use’s “effect of the use upon
90 As

to the debate on the impact of the three-step test on open-ended limitations, such as the US
fair use doctrine, cf. A. Förster, Fair Use, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2008, p. 191-201; M.R.F.
Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in
International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International
2004, p. 133-137 and 162-168; J. Bornkamm, “Der Dreistufentest als urheberrechtliche
Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere eines Begriffs”, in: H.-J. Ahrens/J. Bornkamm/W. Gloy/J.
Starck/J. von Ungern-Sternberg, Festschrift für Willi Erdmann zum 65. Geburtstag,
Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München: Carl Heymanns 2002, p. 45-46; H. Cohen Jehoram, “Restrictions on
Copyright and their Abuse”, European Intellectual Property Review 2005, p. 359; S. Ricketson,
“The three-step test, deemed quantities, libraries and closed exceptions”, Centre for Copyright
Studies, Strawberry Hills NSW 2002, p. 147-154; M. Leaffer, The Uncertain Future of Fair Use in a
Global Information Marketplace, Ohio State Law Journal 62 (2001), p. 849; R. Okediji, “Toward an
International Fair Use Doctrine”, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 39 (2000, p. 75 (116130); J.E. Cohen, “WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use
Survive?”, European Intellectual Property Review 1999, p. 236; T. Newby, “What’s Fair Here is not
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the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” Third, at the 1967

Stockholm Conference, it was the UK delegation, which itself had fair dealing

exceptions in its national law, which proposed the adoption of an abstract

formula rather than a detailed list of specific exceptions. It may thus be better to
see the test as an important link between continental European and Anglo-

American copyright systems than as a prohibition of domestic open-ended

exceptions. Finally, the WTO panel on Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act did
not endorse the view that fair use, by definition, was incompatible with the

requirement of “certain special cases”. Instead, the panel adopted a cautious
approach:

However, there is no need to identify explicitly each and every possible
situation to which the exception could apply, provided that the scope of
the exception is known and particularised. This guarantees a sufficient
degree of legal certainty. 91
The panel thus left room for national legislators to provide for open-ended E&Ls

allowing their courts to make case-by-case determinations that ensure a

sufficient degree of legal certainty. 92

In all legal systems, the role of defining and implementing legal norms is divided
between lawmakers and judges. In what one might call “open clause systems,”

such as fair use, the judge is called upon to explicitly balance abstract criteria as
applied to specific cases. Some might argue that such a system is better to adapt
E&Ls to new and specifically online uses. Others may argue that it is more

unpredictable than specific E&Ls, and that this unpredictability has a cost to both
right holders and users. It is important to recognize, however, that judicial

Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate International Copyright Law?”,
Stanford Law Review 1999, p. 1633.
91 See WTO Document WT/DS160/R, online available at www.wto.org, para. 6.108. See D.
Gervais. The TRIPS Agreement; Drafting History and Analysis, 4th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell
2012, at 280-283.
92 Legal certainty is not necessarily the exclusive task of the legislator. Courts for example may
add or reduce uncertainty.
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interpretation and implementation occur in closed list systems as well. No E&L is
drafted so specifically as to be free from the need for interpretation or to be
devoid of ambiguity as applied in the specific case.

In all systems, even in those who do not recognize the development of binding
precedent, jurisprudence in the form of accepted and repeated official practice
by judges or administrators can become known and works to increase the degree

of legal certainty in the system as a whole. In other words, open factors such as

those in the US fair use doctrine allow courts to determine “certain special cases”

of permissible unauthorized use in the light of the individual circumstances of a

given case, just as must occur to some degree in closed list systems. With every
court decision, a further “special case” becomes known, particularized and thus

“certain” in the sense of the three-step test. A sufficient degree of legal certainty

thus may follow from established case law as well as in detailed legislation. 93 In

sum, while it is conceivable that a court decision might apply fair use in a specific
case in a way that contravenes the test, open-ended rules such as US fair use are

not per se incompatible with the test.

We cannot leave this topic without noting that the US was not obliged to amend
its fair use doctrine when adhering to the 1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention

in 1989 or to the TRIPS Agreement (via its ratification of the WTO Agreement) in

1995. Was it understood that the doctrine complies with the three-step test laid
down in Berne Article 9(2)? 94 One can perhaps find an answer at the 1996
Diplomatic Conference which adopted the WIPO “Internet” treaties, at which the

US delegation underscored that
93 In

this sense already M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An
Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New
York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 162-168. As to the current state of the US fair use
doctrine, see B. Beebe, “An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005”,
University of Pennsylavania Law Review 156 (2008), p. 549; M. Sag, “Predicting Fair Use”, Ohio
State Law Journal 73 (2012), p. 47; P. Samuelson, “Unbundling Fair Uses”, Fordham Law Review
77 (2009), p. 2537. However, see also the critical comments by A. Förster, Fair Use, Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck 2008, p. 197-201, on the unrestricted openness of the US system. With regard to
the predictability of fair use decisions, see also D. Nimmer, “‘Fairest of Them All’ and Other Fairy
Tales of Fair Use”, Law and Contemporary Problems 66 (2003), p. 263.
94 Cf. P. Samuelson, “Challenges for the World Intellectual Property Organization and the Traderelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Council in Regulating Intellectual Property Rights
in the Information Age”, European Intellectual Property Review 1999, 578 (582-583); C.A.
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it was essential that the [WIPO “Internet” treaties] permit the application of the
evolving doctrine of “fair use”, which was recognized in the laws of the United
States of America, and which was also applicable in the digital environment. 95

The delegation went on to stress that the three-step test “should be understood

to permit Contracting Parties to carry forward, and appropriately extend into the
digital environment, limitations and exceptions in their national laws which were

considered acceptable under the Berne Convention.” 96 We found no objection in
the Conference’s record. In fact, as explained in Part I, this language finally made

its way into the Agreed Statement which accompanies the three-step tests of
Article 10 WCT. 97

Alberdingk Thijm, “Fair use: het auteursrechtelijk evenwicht hersteld”, Tijdschrift voor auteurs-,
media- en informatierecht 1998, 145 (152-153).
95 See Minutes of Main Committee I, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, 70.
96 See Minutes of Main Committee I, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102, 70.
97 For the full text of the agreed statement concerning article 10 WCT, see subsection 3.3.2.
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Part IV – The Enabling Function of the Three-Step Test
A. The three step test and the enablement of national legislation

From the perspective of national legislation, it would seem more logical to

interpret the three step test as not designed exclusively for restricting new use

privileges, but also as enabling them. As we explained in Part I above, the first
version of the three-step test was devised as a flexible framework at the 1967

Stockholm Conference on the revision of the Berne Convention, within which

national legislators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national E&Ls and
satisfying domestic social, cultural, and economic needs. 98 The provision was

intended to serve as a basis of national E&Ls to the reproduction right.

Accordingly, Article 9(2) is intended to offer national lawmakers the freedom:
…to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.

Many use privileges that have become widespread at the national level are
directly based on the international three-step test. A provision that permits the

introduction of national exemptions for private copying, for instance, is not

expressly provided in international copyright law. It is the international threestep test that creates breathing space for the adoption of this type of E&L at the

national level. Many other examples of national E&Ls resting on the international

three-step test can easily be found in the copyright laws of Berne Union
Members, for example reproduction for research or teaching purposes; the
privilege of libraries, archives and museums to make copies to preserve cultural
98 See

WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Geneva: WIPO 1971, Doc. S/1, p. 81. For a discussion of the breathing space offered by the threestep test, A. Kur, “Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and
Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?”, Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 8 (2009), p.
287; M.R.F. Senftleben, “Grundprobleme des urheberrechtlichen Dreistufentests”, Gewerblicher
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht International 2004, p. 200 (206-207). For a proposal to use the
three-step test as an instrument to delineate the exclusive rights of copyright owners, see D.

– 35 –

material; and the exemption of reproduction required for administrative,
parliamentary or judicial proceedings. The three-step test of Article 9(2),

therefore, has the function of creating space for the introduction of E&Ls at the
national level.

This understanding made its way into Article 13 TRIPS and played a decisive role

during the negotiations of the WIPO Internet treaties. 99 In Article 10(1) WCT, it

paved the way for an agreement on E&Ls of the rights granted under that treaty,

including the right of making available. 100 As pointed out in Part 1 above, the
Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 WCT confirms that the test is intended
to serve as a basis for the further development of existing and the creation of
new E&Ls in the digital environment.

Finally, it is important to note that, while the three-step test can be interpreted
as a flexible policy instrument, the transposition of the international three-step

test into national law can fundamentally modify its operation. Specifically, when
the three-step test is implemented in national law as an additional control
mechanism with regard to E&Ls that have already been defined narrowly, the

test is no longer performing the enabling function it has at the international level.

Instead, it serves as a further restriction imposed on national E&Ls. 101

Gervais, “Toward a New Core International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test”,
Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review 9 (2005), p. 1.
99 With regard to the evolution of this “family” of copyright three-step tests in international
copyright law, see M.R.F. Senftleben, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of
the Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer
Law International 2004, p. 43-98; N. Dittrich, “Der Dreistufentest”, in: N. Dittrich (ed.), Beiträge
zum Urheberrecht VIII, Wien 2005, p. 63; J. Bornkamm, “Der Dreistufentest als urheberrechtliche
Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere eines Begriffs”, in: H.-J. Ahrens/J. Bornkamm/W. Gloy/J.
Starck/J. von Ungern-Sternberg, Festschrift für Willi Erdmann zum 65. Geburtstag,
Köln/Berlin/Bonn/München: Carl Heymanns 2002, p. 29.
100 As to the debate in the context of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties, see M.R.F. Senftleben,
Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International
and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 96-98;
M. Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet: The 1996 WIPO Treaties, their Interpretation and
Implementation, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002; J. Reinbothe/S. Von Lewinski, The WIPO
Treaties 1996: Commentary and Legal Analysis, Butterworths 2002.
101 For a more detailed discussion of this problem, see M.R.F. Senftleben, “The International
Three-Step Test: A Model Provision for EC Fair Use Legislation”, Journal of Intellectual Property,
Information Technology and E-Commerce Law 1 (2010), p. 67; C. Geiger, “From Berne to National
Law, via the Copyright Directive: The Dangerous Mutations of the Three-Step Test”, European
Intellectual Property Review 2007, p. 486.
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B. Illustrative Cases

Confirming the test’s role in creating sufficient room for social, cultural and
economic interests that have to be balanced against the rationales of copyright
protection, the test has been used in an enabling sense in several court decisions.

For instance, the German Federal Court of Justice underlined the public interest

in unhindered access to information in a 1999 decision concerning the Technical

Information Library Hannover. It offered support for the Library’s practice of

copying and dispatching scientific articles on request by single persons and
industrial undertakings. 102 The legal basis of this practice was the statutory E&L

for personal use in § 53 of the German Copyright Act. Under this provision, the
authorized user need not necessarily produce the copy herself but is free to ask a

third party to make the reproduction on her behalf. The Court admitted that the

dispatch of copies came close to a publisher’s activity. 103 Nonetheless, it

refrained from putting an end to the library’s practice as conflicting with a

work’s normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an obligation to pay
equitable remuneration from the three-step test as compensation to copyright

holders, and enabled the continuation of the information service in this way. 104

In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing of press articles for

internal e-mail communication within a private company, the German Federal
Court of Justice gave a further example of its flexible approach to the three-step
test. It held that digital press reviews had to be deemed permissible under §
102 See Bundesgerichtshof, February 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, Juristenzeitung 1999, p. 1000,
with case comment by H. Schack. For an English description of the case, see M.R.F. Senftleben,
Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test: An Analysis of the Three-Step Test in International
and EC Copyright Law, The Hague/London/New York: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 206208.
103 See Bundesgerichtshof, February 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, Juristenzeitung 1999, p. 1004.
104 See Bundesgerichtshof, February 25, 1999, case I ZR 118/96, Juristenzeitung 1999, p. 10051007. Cf. P. Baronikians, “Kopienversand durch Bibliotheken – rechtliche Beurteilung und
Vorschläge zur Regelung”, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 1999, p. 126. In the course of
subsequent amendments to the Copyright Act, the German legislator modeled a new copyright
E&L on the Court’s decision. § 53a of the German Copyright Act goes beyond the court decision by
including the dispatch of digital copies in graphical format.
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49(1) of the German Copyright Act just like their analog counterparts if the

digital version – in terms of its functioning and potential for use – essentially
corresponded to traditional analog products. 105 To overcome the problem of an

outdated wording of § 49(1) that seemed to indicate the E&L’s confinement to

press reviews on paper, 106 the Court stated that, in view of new technical
developments, a copyright E&L could be interpreted more liberally. 107 The Court

arrived at the conclusion that digital press reviews were permissible if articles

were included in graphical format without offering additional functions, such as
a text collection and an index. This extension of the analog press review

exception to the digital environment, the Court maintained, was in line with the
three-step test as incorporated in the EU Information Society Directive
2001/29. 108

Similarly, in a decision dated 26 June 2007, the Swiss Supreme Court used the

three step test to propose an extensive and liberal interpretation of the private
use exception included in Article 19(1)c of the Swiss Copyright Act 109, in order to

legitimize the use of press articles by specialized commercial services providing

electronic press reviews upon demand to enterprises 110. The court held that in

order to guarantee the diversity of opinion needed for the free processes of

democracy and to permit the development of a true information society, there
105 See

Bundesgerichtshof, July 11, 2002, case I ZR 255/00, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht 2002, p. 963; Juristenzeitung 2003, p. 473, with case comment by Th. Dreier. Cf.
Th. Hoeren, “Pressespiegel und das Urheberrecht”, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht
2002, p. 1022.
106 § 49(1) of the German Copyright Act, as in force at that time, referred to
“Informationsblätter.”
107 See Bundesgerichtshof, July 11, 2002, case I ZR 255/00, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht 2002, p. 966-966.
108 See Bundesgerichtshof, July 11, 2002, case I ZR 255/00, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und
Urheberrecht 2002, p. 966-967. The Court referred to the three-step test of Article 5(5) of the EC
Copyright Directive 2001/29. The EC three-step test enshrined in this provision, however, does
not deviate from the international three-step test.
109 According to Article 19(1)c, private use is understood to mean the reproduction of copies of
works within enterprises, public administrations, institutions, commissions and similar
organizations for internal information or documentation purposes.
110 Swiss Supreme Court, 1st Civil Division, 26 June 2007, International Review of Intellectual
Property and Competition Law 39 (2008), p. 990. For a comment see C. Geiger, “Rethinking
Copyright Limitations in the Information Society: The Swiss Supreme Court Leads the Way”, 39
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2008, p. 943.
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was a public interest in facilitating the making and offering of press reviews by

commercial services without having to obtain the authorization of each publisher.
The judges then went on to consider that even if the text of the law had been

drafted with analogue reproduction in mind, its application had to be extended

to the digital world in order to achieve its objectives. The Court then examined in
detail the solution adopted in the light of the three-step test. After having

recalled the content of the different steps, the Supreme Court held that the third
step of the test was worded differently in the different international documents

and it was not obvious what interests were to be taken into account in this step.

While in the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty the exceptions and limits
must not cause “an unjustified prejudice to the legitimate interest of the author”,

the TRIPS Agreement addresses “the legitimate interests of the rightholder.” As
the interests of the authors and those of other rightholders are not always

identical, it follows, according to the Court, that the three-step test serves to
protect the author's interests at least as much as those of the exploiters in

receiving remuneration for its use.

In a 2008 decision, the Supreme Court of Colombia referred to the three step test
(as included in Article 21 of Decision 351 of the Andean Community) in carving

out a new exception to criminal liability for private non-commercial format

shifting. Using the three-step test as an overarching principle, the Court held that

there was no fundamental encroachment upon the exclusive rights of the

copyright owner where the use did not conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work and did not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
copyright holder. The criteria of the test were thus used to create an additional

hurdle to be surmounted for a finding of criminal liability. The Court concluded

that in order to establish a criminal offence, it was necessary to ascertain

whether the allegedly punishable act was carried out with a profit motive and
the intention to harm the work or the economic interests of the copyright owner.
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In the light of this standard, the Court clarified that format shifting for the
purpose of private study and enjoyment did not constitute a criminal offence. 111

Despite the risks already noted of incorporating the three step test into domestic
legislation as a standard to be applied in individual cases, courts in jurisdictions

where this has occurred have sometimes taken advantage of the presence of the
three step test in order to expand the effective scope of limitations. An example
can be found in Spain where the Supreme Court, in an attempt to safeguard

search engine and caching services, resorted to general principles of the law,

such as the social function of property, the exercise of rights in good faith and the

prohibition of abuse of rights in its interpretation and application of the threestep test. In Megakini.com/Google Spain, Google had been sued for copyright

infringement on the grounds that its search service involved the reproduction

and display of fragments of copyrighted website content, and the accompanying

cache service led to the reproduction and making available of entire web pages.

The Court concluded that there were no exceptions available under Spanish
copyright legislation to defend the unauthorized use of copyrighted material but
was also seeking to create policy space for these search services, 112 The Court

found that the three-step test in the Spanish Copyright Act did not only have a

“negative” meaning (in the sense of setting forth the limits of permissible

exceptions), but also a “positive” meaning in the sense of reflecting the need to

set aside copyright protection in certain cases. 113

111 Supreme

Court of Colombia, 30 April 2008, case Casación 29188, "Guillermo Luis Vélez
Murillo", available at http://www.karisma.org.co/carolina_publico/Sentencia%20CSJ.rtf. For a
case comment, see J.A. Pabón Cadavid/C. Botero Cabrera, "Colombian Ruling on Copyright:
Without
Profit
There
is
no
Criminal
Offence",
available
at
http://archive.icommons.org/articles/colombian-ruling-on-copyright-without-profit-there-isno-criminal-offence.
112 Spanish Supreme Court, 3 April 2012, judgment 172/2012 (Megakini.com v. Google Spain),
part 5, para. 5. For a short description and discussion of the judgment in English, see R.
Xalabarder, ‘Spanish Supreme Court rules in favour of Google search engine’, Kluwer Copyright
Blog, 15 June 2012, online available at http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/06/15/spanishsupreme-court-rules-in-favor-of-google-search-engine/.
113 Spanish Supreme Court, 3 April 2012, judgment 172/2012 (Megakini.com v. Google Spain),
part 5, para. 5.
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The Court ascertained whether in the individual circumstances of the case, the

copyright owners experienced any real prejudice to their legitimate interests or
faced an encroachment upon the normal exploitation of the work. 114 The Court

apparently saw the copyright claim as an attempt to receive damages for an

unauthorized use which, in fact, could be deemed beneficial for the claimant

because it facilitated access to his web pages and provided information about his
website. The Court rejected the copyright claim because it amounted to an abuse
(indeed, and “antisocial” exercise) of rights. 115 It found that, in the absence of any

real prejudice, the protection of copyright may not be misused to harm another
party on the basis of what it considered unfounded allegations. 116

Flexible E&Ls in national legislation enabled by the three-step test go beyond the

court decisions just described. The main point here, however, is that lawmakers

may use the three step test either to make specific lists of exceptions or to create

open ended exceptions reflecting the test’s abstract criteria. Fair use and fair
dealing legislation, which may be seen as compatible with and enabled by the
three-step test 117, provide good examples of this type of flexible law making.

Besides the well-known fair use doctrine codified in US legislation in 1976, 118
114 Spanish

Supreme Court, 3 April 2012, judgment 172/2012 (Megakini.com v. Google Spain),
part 5, para. 5. For an earlier proposal to use the three-step test as an instrument to delineate the
exclusive rights of copyright owners, see Daniel Gervais, Towards a New Core International
Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, MARQUETTE INTELL PROP L REV 9 (2005), p. 1.
115 Spanish Supreme Court, 3 April 2012, judgment 172/2012 (Megakini.com v. Google Spain),
part 5, para. 5, para. 6. More generally on the social function of copyright and its consequences
see C. Geiger, “The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, Or how Ethics can Influence the
Shape and Use of IP law”, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & Competition Law
Research Paper No. 13-06, forthcoming in: G.B. Dinwoodie (ed.), Intellectual Property Law:
Methods and Perspectives, Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, Edward Elgar, 2014
116 Spanish Supreme Court, 3 April 2012, judgment 172/2012 (Megakini.com v. Google Spain),
part 5, para. 5, para. 8.
117 Naturally both UK fair dealing and US fair use (as judge made law) predate the 1967 test.
118 The codification was not intended to change the open-ended character of the fair use doctrine.
See Senate and House Committee Reports, as quoted by L.E. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in
Copyright – The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the 1976 Copyright Act, Cambridge
(Massachusetts)/London: Harvard University Press 1978, p. 19-20: “…since the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case raising the
question must be decided on its own facts… The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of
the judicial doctrine of fair use […] but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the
statute… Beyond a very broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria
applicable to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-bycase basis.”
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open-ended copyright E&Ls have now been adopted in a number of countries. 119

The 1997 Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines provides for a fair use
factor analysis to be conducted with regard to the use of a copyrighted work for
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, research, and similar

purposes. 120 In the framework of a 2006 amendment, Singapore adopted an
open fair dealing provision that allows the identification of privileged uses on the

basis of a catalogue of abstract factors. 121 The 2007 Copyright Act of Israel

permits fair use for purposes such as private study, research, criticism, review,

journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction and examination by an
educational institution. 122 A 2012 amendment to the Copyright Act of Malaysia

resulted in a fair dealing provision for purposes including research, private study,
criticism, review or the reporting of news or current events. 123 In its recent

Copyright enactments, such as Bill C-20, as well as through decisions of the

Supreme Court, Canada has significantly expanded the scope of fair dealing in

that jurisdiction toward flexibility. 124 The 2013 Copyright Act of Korea exempts

fair use, among other things, for reporting, criticism, education, and research. 125

In consultations on new copyright legislation, open-ended copyright E&Ls have

also been proposed in Australia, Ireland and the UK. 126 An open clause in the
119 See

also J. Band and J. Gerafi, “The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook”, policy bandwidth March
2013, available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi2013.pdf, reproducing the fair use and fair dealing statutes of 40 countries.
120 Section 185.1 of the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.
121 Sections 35 and 36 of the Copyright Act of Singapore.
122 Article 19 of the Copyright Act of Israel. Cf. O. Fischman Afori, “An Open Standard “Fair Use”
Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli Initiative”, European Intellectual Property Review 2008, p. 85; G.
Pessach, “The New Israeli Copyright Act: A Case-Study in Reverse Comparative Law”,
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 41 (2010), p. 187 (189-193).
123 Section 13(2)(a) of the Copyright Act of Malaysia.
124 See Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in
THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATION OF CANADIAN
COPYRIGHT LAW (M. Geist, ed.), 157 (2013). Court made law to that extent on fair dealing is
somewhat unusual, however. Professor d’Agostino noted in that respect that this “Canadian
interventionism is set against other higher courts that rarely rehear fair dealing cases. …It seems
that when common law courts outside Canada do hear fair dealing cases, they are contained to
their role of judicial interpretation and do not overreach into law and policy making.” Giuseppina
d’Agostino, The Arithemtic of Fair Dealing at the Supreme Court of Canada, in id. 187, 201.
125 Article 35-3 of the Copyright Act of the Republic of Korea.
126 I. Hargreaves, Digital opportunity. A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, May 2011, p. 5,
available at http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipreview-finalreport.pdf; Copyright Review Committee,
Copyright and Innovation – A Consultation Paper, Dublin: Department of Jobs, Enterprise and
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catalogue of use privileges has been recommended in the Model European

Copyright Code, which is the result of the Wittem Project of copyright scholars

across the EU concerned with the future development of EU copyright law. 127

Likewise, a Global Network on Copyright Users Rights composed of copyright

experts from closed list as well as open clause systems crafted a model open
flexible E&L that was “designed to be adaptable in general form to most
copyright laws – including those in common and civil law systems.” 128

Innovation 2012, p. 111-123; Australian Law Reform Commission, Copyright and the Digital
Economy, Discussion Paper 79, Sydney: ALRC 2013, p. 59-98.
127 The proposed European Copyright Code of the Wittem Project is available at
www.copyrightcode.eu. See Article 5.5. On the Code and its provision on E&Ls, see T. Dreier, “The
Wittem Project of a European Copyright Code”, in : C. Geiger (ed), Constructing European
Intellectual Property: Achievements and New Perspectives, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK/Northampton, MA, 2013, p. 292. As to the need for flexible fair use solutions in the EU, see P.B.
Hugenholtz, M.R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe. In Search of Flexibilities, Amsterdam: Institute
for Information Law/VU Centre for Law and Governance 2011, p. 17-18, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1959554; M.R.F. Senftleben, “Bridging the Differences between
Copyright's Legal Traditions – The Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine”, Journal of the Copyright
Society of the U.S.A. 57 (2010), p. 521; C. Geiger, “Effectivité et flexibilité : deux impératifs de
l’adaptation du droit des ‘exceptions’”, Revue Lamy Droit de l’Immatériel 2013, Special issue, No.
94, 41.
128 For further information on this Global Network, see http://infojustice.org/flexible-use.
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Part V – Conclusion

The three-step test in international copyright law constitutes a flexible balancing
tool that offers national policy makers breathing space for the creation of an
appropriate system of copyright E&Ls at the national level. At the 1967

Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention, the first threestep test in international copyright law was devised as a flexible framework,

within which national legislators would enjoy the freedom of adopting national
E&Ls to satisfy domestic social, cultural and economic needs. With the inclusion
of the test in the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO “Internet” treaties and the VIP

Treaty, it has not lost this function of enabling tailor-made solutions at the

national level. The WIPO “Internet” treaties confirmed that the three-step test

allows the extension of traditional copyright E&Ls into the digital environment
and the development of appropriate new E&Ls.

The abstract criteria of the three-step test offer room for different

interpretations. The approach taken by a WTO panel in the case concerning
section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act should not be seen as the final word on

the test’s interpretation. Various alternative approaches have been developed in

literature and applied by national courts, including an understanding of the

three-step test as a refined proportionality test, the use of its abstract criteria as
factors to be weighed in a global balancing exercise and a reverse reading of the

test starting with the last, most flexible criterion. In light of the need to balance
copyright against competing interests, in particular freedom of expression and
information, these flexible interpretations may prevail in the future.
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